Why the Korean War still matters 75 years later

It’s been 75 years since the Korean War began, but the lessons it left behind still echo loudly today

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With the blessing and discreet support of the Soviet Union, North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, thus launching an extraordinarily brutal conflict that’s now often forgotten. When it eventually concluded in stalemate more than three years later, little had changed territorially. But the human cost was substantial. Counting Korean civilians, several million were dead.

The conflict’s origins can be traced to the closing days of the Second World War. Japan had occupied Korea since 1910, so the 1945 Japanese collapse created a void, which was filled by the Soviets in the northern part of the peninsula and the Americans in the southern part.

In due course, independent states were established in both halves, neither of which was remotely democratic. Still, the fact that refugee traffic ran overwhelmingly from north to south gives an indication of relative desirability.

The invasion by North Korea was launched under the assumption of little serious resistance. After all, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly excluded South Korea from America’s defensive perimeter. But that quickly changed.

Facilitated by the Soviets boycotting the United Nations Security Council in a dispute over who represented China, the Americans organized an international response under UN auspices. The American president, Harry Truman, never sought congressional approval. Instead, he fought the war as a UN “police action.”

Initially, the North Koreans swept everything before them, but the situation shifted dramatically after U.S. General Douglas MacArthur’s daring amphibious landing at Inchon. The North Koreans were soon driven back and chased as far north as the Yalu River, which brought the conflict to the Chinese border. Several hundred thousand Chinese troops then entered the fray on the North Korean side and the pendulum swung back before settling into a grim war of attrition at the approximate starting positions.

Armistice talks began in the autumn of 1951 but dragged on inconclusively. Meanwhile, Dwight Eisenhower ran for president in 1952, promising that, if elected, he would “go to Korea” to personally assess the situation. He did just that as president-elect, and the war ended in July 1953, six months after his inauguration.

Although the mutually exhausted stalemate had undoubtedly created propitious conditions for an armistice, Eisenhower’s propensity for ruthlessness was also called into play. South Korean President Syngman Rhee wanted to continue fighting, so Eisenhower cut back on fuel and ammunition supplies for Rhee’s army. And to underline the point, he threatened a total withdrawal of American forces. Rhee got the message.

The UN action was under American command and approximately 90 per cent of the deployed forces were American, as were the casualties—some 36,000 killed. Canada provided the fourth-largest UN contingent, 516 of whom died.

Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis has noted two things about the Korean War. One, that it established the precedent of a country with nuclear weapons being involved in a bloody and protracted conflict without opting to use those weapons. And two, that although Soviet and American pilots did surreptitious battle with each other over Korean skies, the mutual interest in preventing escalation was such that both countries chose to cover it up.

So here’s the question. On balance, would it have been preferable to stand back and allow North Korea to have its wicked way?

People will honestly differ on that, but there’s no doubt about one fact: 75 years on, South Korea has evolved into a full-fledged democracy and economic powerhouse, while North Korea remains a totalitarian basket case. Whether that evolution was worth the sacrifice of the dead UN soldiers is another issue.

Korea was the first significant combat outing of the U.S. as the guarantor of the post-war order. Or, if you prefer, the global policeman. It’s a role that’s long generated mixed feelings.

When countries don’t approve of a particular action, they often complain about American hubris or American imperialism. But if their own security is threatened, they immediately look to the U.S. for protection.

Within the U.S. itself, the role has always been controversial. In immediate post-war America, the influential Republican senator Robert Taft was simultaneously skeptical of NATO, opposed to the idea of keeping American troops in Europe, in favour of a policy of non-intervention, and ready to balance the budget by cutting defence. My Chicago-resident uncle was decisively in the non-interventionist camp, being unable to understand why his son (who survived) was drafted to serve in Korea.

Still, the global policeman mindset dominated American policy for most of the ensuing decades. Or it did until recently.

Donald Trump is often described as an isolationist, but that’s a profoundly shallow assessment. As recent events demonstrate, he’s prepared to dramatically intervene if he perceives an important American interest to be at stake. Otherwise, he’ll take a pass.

Had Trump been president in 1950, the South Koreans might’ve been out of luck.

Troy Media columnist Pat Murphy casts a history buff’s eye at the goings-on in our world. Never cynical – well, perhaps a little bit.